not yet systematically covered. First, it looks into the institutionalization of the Court and underlines the importance of a separate judicial authority responsible for the legal order. Second, the chapter analyzes the changes in the powers of the Court as compared to its predecessor with a focus on the disappearance of some of the most important ones. Third, it tries to uncover the reasons for such a drastic reduction in powers. Fourth, it looks into further limitations of the Court, which can negatively impact the Court's ability to achieve its objective. Fifth, recognizing the importance of cooperation between the national judiciary and the EAEU Court, the chapter outlines the problems that have already arisen therein. Finally, the chapter provides some preliminary conclusions. It is premature to draw general conclusions on the practical performance of the EAEU Court since it has delivered rulings on only a handful of cases so far. 3 However, an analysis of the written provisions on the Court, and an analysis of certain practices of its predecessor can shed some light on its abilities to perform its functions. The cases decided in 2015 are available at: <http://courteurasian.org/page-24051>, and cases of 2016 -are available at: <http://courteurasian.org/page-24161> (accessed on 9 January 2017).
A Dedicated Court
When the Treaty on EAEU came into force in 2015, a new permanent judicial body was created. 4 The new Court replaces the judicial body of the now defunct Eurasian Economic Community (hereinafter 'EURASEC'), and the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space. 5 The issue of succession is somewhat blurred, however. Initially, the idea was to ensure legal succession between the two courts. 6 Eventually it was reduced to a provision that the case-law of the EURASEC Court remains in force. 7 What is important, though, is that there is finally a judicial body dedicated exclusively to one legal order. The previous EURASEC Court was responsible for two legal orders during the short period of its functioning from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2014: EURASEC on one hand, and the Customs Union and Single Economic Space on the other. Prior to that, the situation was even more complicated as the judicial body of the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter 'CIS') in addition to its functions as the Economic Court of the CIS, performed the functions of the EURASEC Court. 8 According to the former president of the CIS Economic Court, Abdulloev, this situation was logical and well-grounded for the purposes of optimizing the judiciary in the post-Soviet space. Indeed, the CIS Economic Court has a peculiar status and is not exclusively tied to the CIS. As Shinkaretskaya notes, the CIS Statute does not define it as a CIS body, there is no The problematic nature of the situation was recognized in a report on the formation of the EURASEC Court as it underlined that the status quo did not correspond to the realities of the intensified integration process within the Customs Union and Single Economic Space, and that the creation of a separate and independent judicial body was needed.
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The EAEU legal order has a dedicated court now, and the question is whether it is able to ensure the functioning of that order.
The Powers (or Lack Thereof)
In order to fulfil the ambitious task of ensuring the uniform application of EAEU law, the Court has to possess corresponding powers. The Statute of the EAEU Court establishes that upon request of a member state or an economic entity, 13 <www.eurasiancommission.org/docs/Download.aspx?IsDlg=0&ID=2608&print=1> (accessed on 9 January 2017). 13 The EAEU Treaty defines an 'economic entity' or 'market participant' as a "commercial organization or a non-profit organization operating with generation of profit, an individual entrepreneur, as well as a natural issues raised about the implementation of EAEU law. Member states can also raise issues concerning the compliance of international agreements within the EAEU with the EAEU Treaty, the compliance of other member states with EAEU law, the compliance of the decisions of the main regulatory body -the Eurasian Economic Commission (hereinafter 'Commission') -with EAEU law, and challenge an action (or inaction) of the Commission.
14 These procedures can be respectively classified as infringements, actions for annulment and failures to act. A positive feature is the retaining of the procedure established within the EURASEC Court, where economic entities, including foreign ones, can raise issues of compliance of a Commission decision that directly affect their economic rights, with the EAEU Treaty and/or international agreements within the EAEU. The same can be done in regard to an action (or lack thereof) of the Commission.
However, two procedures that were available in the EURASEC Court are absent: (1) the ability of the Commission to refer member states failing to comply with EAEU law to the Court; (2) the preliminary ruling. These two procedures are important for many reasons, among which are the necessity to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of Union law and that without them member states can avoid fulfilling their obligations.
In the case of infringements, only member states can bring actions against other member states for noncompliance (which is a novelty compared to EURASEC), not the Commission. The Commission is deprived of such a function, which, however limited, was available before. 15 If after the Commission's monitoring of compliance with international agreements, which formed the legal basis of the Customs Union and Single Economic Space, there were reasons to believe that one of the parties had not complied with such agreements or Commission decisions, the Commission Council could inform the relevant party and establish a time frame to address the infringement. If the decision was not complied with, the Commission Council had the right to refer the issue to the EURASEC Court. The Court could also introduce reasonable interim measures to ensure compliance with the decision or to prevent possible further infringements. 17 Usually, infringements by member states are in the form of the non-implementation of obligations under EU law or adoption of domestic legal acts, which contravene to the obligations within the organization. 18 The existence of an obligatory and exclusive judicial body for these kinds of cases makes the EU different from many other international organizations, and this procedure is the most important tool to ensure the implementation of EU law. The lack of procedure in the EAEU is a clear rollback in supranationality and a return to the common practice in international public law where compliance with international contractual obligations is decided between parties to respective agreements. 19 This does not promote effective judicial control or functioning of the EAEU legal order. Moreover, as many years of EU experience suggest, a member state rarely brings an action against another member state to the ECJ, as it is a sign of malevolence and there is the risk of analogous actions against them in the future, and member states prefer political dispute resolution. 20 However, the actions brought by the European Commission against member states are common and member states tend to comply with the decisions of the ECJ against them. 21 The other procedure that has been abolished with the advent of the EAEU, arguably the most important one, is the preliminary ruling. This procedure is a system of judicial oversight within the judicial systems of member states in cooperation with an organization's court. When the issue of interpretation of law of the organization appears before a national court, such a court can stay the case and make an inquiry to the court of the organization for an interpretation. In the EU, when a national court is the court of final instance, it is obliged to refer to the ECJ with such an inquiry. 22 After the ruling is delivered, it is sent back to the national court, which rules on the case in hand. Therefore, national courts and the organization's court are integrated into a single system of judicial oversight.
In the EURASEC Court the preliminary ruling procedure, however limited, was available. Even though it was used only once there, 23 EU practice suggests that the ECJ and the national courts of EU member states use this procedure regularly. 24 Attempts of member states to circumvent certain EU legal obligations are frequently challenged in their own national courts. Through this procedure, individuals become, to a certain extent, agents monitoring member states' compliance with EU legal obligations.
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The goal of the EU preliminary ruling procedure is similar to the whole mission of the EAEU Court, which is to preserve the uniform interpretation of the law and the effective functioning of the legal order itself. However, this procedure also goes beyond that stated purpose to also protect individual rights. Through this procedure, the national courts of EU member states and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) are integrated into one system of judicial supervision. Even when there are limits of direct access of individuals to the CJEU, the supremacy and direct effect of EU law enables any individual or organization to challenge the actions of their own member states using EU law.
The removal of the preliminary ruling procedure in the EAEU Court makes national courts disintegrated from the Eurasian judicial system. This will inevitably lead to differing practices and make the job of the EAEU Court to ensure the uniform application of Union law extremely difficult. The procedure that could compensate for the lack of the preliminary ruling procedure is the ability of member state to assign state bodies (including courts) the competence to request clarifications from the EAEU Court. 26 Leaving the issue of access to judicial interpretation in the hands of member states is not reassuring. However, practice will show the viability of this measure.
Reasons behind the Reduction in Powers
It could be argued that the member states have adopted a critical approach to the practice of judicial review on a supranational level along the lines of critical approaches to judicial review in general. 27 However, such critical accounts are based on the notion of democracy, that is, people and their elected and accountable representatives. Thus, it is argued that judicial review threatens democracy and is both fundamentally unfair and politically dangerous, as unelected judges who are not directly accountable gain considerable power. In theory, the idea that member states themselves can interpret the EAEU law would be closer to such accountability. However, how democratic are the member states in question themselves?
It is more likely that this is just one instance of a range of power-preserving measures by member states. There are many reasons why member states would want to limit the powers of the EAEU judiciary. One of them is the activist attitude taken by the previous EURASEC Court from the very start, borrowing from the ECJ. 28 The court's practices even led Ispolinov to describe it as a "new-style institution of international justice". 29 He claims that one of its very first judgments -Iuzhnii Kuzbass 30 -was the first case of judicial activism in the post-Soviet space. 31 In this case, treaty interpretation was more extensive than the textual provisions suggest. In particular, while the relevant EURASEC legal acts did not explicitly provide the EURASEC Court with powers to declare Commission's decisions void, the Court decided otherwise. It declared the Commission's decision void, decided on the time when it became void, and made the judgment applicable not only to the parties of the dispute, but erga omne. Following that, it is probably not surprising that the new EAEU Court has been explicitly banned from deciding on such issues, and Commission decisions remain in effect until the Commission implements the ruling. Such judicial activism, even though potentially irritating for member states, is not something that could promote such tremendous changes as removing the preliminary ruling procedure altogether. However, activism that is not well grounded and involves direct confrontation could be more than irritating. An example of the first (and the last) preliminary ruling action could serve as an illustrative example. A request for a preliminary ruling was made by the Supreme Economic Court of Belarus. However, it almost immediately withdrew the request. Nevertheless, the EURASEC Court decided to open the proceedings as it had a right to do so. 32 However, the EURASEC Court's argumentation was peculiar: "as, if decided otherwise, it would not meet the requirements of procedural economy and might lead to an unjustified delay in adjudication of the case". 33 It is very unclear how exactly procedural economy would be affected and why there would be a delay at all. It has been suggested in a text coauthored by one of the judges involved in the case that this approach was taken from the ECJ's Rules of Procedure (a draft at the time).
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The EURASEC Court's statement can only be understood in light of the explanation given by the drafters of the ECJ Rules of Procedure, and particularly the following norm (in the formulation of the final version of the Rules of Procedure): "The withdrawal of a request may be taken into account until notice of the date of delivery of the judgment has been served on the interested persons".
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This provision retains the right to deliver a judgment notwithstanding the withdrawal of a request for a preliminary ruling. The drafters explain this provision in terms of procedural economy "since a number of similar cases may have been stayed, either by the [ECJ] or by national courts or tribunals, pending the forthcoming judgment". 36 In that case not delivering a judgment could lead to dealing with every case that has been stayed, which would cause a delay in the progress of those cases. However, the drafters underlined that such a withdrawal must happen "at a very advanced stage of the proceedings, when the date of delivery of the judgment has been communicated" and when "the [ECJ's] deliberations will have been completed". Conversely, in the case of the EURASEC Court, the withdrawal request was made at an early stage, only two weeks after the request for preliminary ruling was accepted. 37 As noted in the dissenting opinion of judge Smirnov, there was no proof of similar cases stayed in national courts pending the forthcoming judgment; and no proof that the proceedings before the Supreme Economic Court of Belarus could be delayed. 38 Claims, such as lack of explanation of the withdrawal request, that the EURASEC Court had already involved a number of experts, do not seem to be enough. Therefore, it is more likely that the Court, having had the very first preliminary ruling request, wanted to seize the opportunity and establish its authority. A number of activist provisions in the final ruling (e.g. that the ruling was "directly effective" on the territory of all member states) reinforce this position.
Therefore, the assertive attitude of the EURASEC Court coupled with the overreaction of the member states have led to the disastrous situation the whole legal order is currently in.
Further Limitations
This situation is not limited to the elimination of the preliminary ruling procedure and the denial of the Commission's right to bring member states to the Court. There is a provision, according to which the Court does not have power to vest the EAEU institutions with additional competence in excess of that explicitly provided in the treaties. 39 Arguably, this rule intends to limit the ability of the Court to define the implied powers of an organization, to a large extent the way the CJEU did for the EU, 40 and the International Court of
Justice for the United Nations. 41 Further, the Court's decisions do not change and/or invalidate the norms of EAEU law or national law, which are in force, and the Court does not create new ones. 42 Compare this to the belief of one of the judges that the Court is actually able to create new legal rules. 43 Neither of these provisions existed in the EURASEC More general provisions regarding the Court do not help to ameliorate the situation. There is no provision similar to the EU's exclusive jurisdiction. 44 It is also stipulated that the Court's interpretation of the EAEU Treaty on request of the member states or institutions is consultative and does not deny the right of member states' joint interpretation.
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The Statute of the Court does not designate explicit powers to the Court so that it can issue penalties. Moreover, it is left to the parties of a dispute to determine the form and manner of execution of the Court's decision. 46 If a judgment is not implemented, a member state can apply to the EAEU Supreme Council "for measures required for its [implementation]".
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The EAEU Treaty does not clarify the procedure that is followed specifically in this case, making the EAEU Supreme Council's general rule of consensus applicable. 48 As it consists of the heads of member states, it can be concluded that when an EAEU Court decision is not implemented by a member state, the head of that state can still vote on the measures to be adopted by the Supreme Council to ensure implementation. Finally, the independence of the judges is under question. To be fair, the EAEU Court has gained the right to draft its own budgetary proposals and to dispose of financial means, 49 which somewhat boosts its independence. However, the Court has lost the right to approve its own rules of procedure, which is now done by the EAEU Supreme Council. 50 The judges are no longer elected by the Parliamentary Assembly (the institution does not exist anymore), but are proposed by member states and appointed by the Supreme Council. 
Some Issues of National Judiciary
As stated above, national courts have been completely disintegrated from the Eurasian judicial system. An essential part of the ability of the Court to ensure the functioning of the EAEU legal order is the way national judiciaries perceive its authority. In this respect it is interesting to turn to the Constitutional Court of Russia, which has already voiced its differences in approaches to the Eurasian judiciary. 54 For instance, it has stated that on the Russian soil the norms of the Customs Code of the Customs Union, which have now become part of the EAEU, should be implemented according to its own interpretation. 55 However, importantly, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Russia on other international courts could affect the authority of the EAEU Court. Thus, the ruling concerning the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter 'ECtHR') is significant.
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According to that ruling, the Constitutional Court maintains that Russia can set aside international obligations if it is the only option to prevent the violation of the principles and norms of the Russian Constitution. When formulating its own position, the Constitutional Court heavily relied on the rulings of constitutional authorities of Germany, 57 Italy, 58 Austria, 59 and the UK, 60 which were critical of the ECtHR. However, the Constitutional Court went beyond that. First, the Constitutional Court referred to the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, in particular Article 31(1), which establishes that a treaty must be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose". 61 Following this provision, the Constitutional Court claimed that an international treaty is obligatory to the parties in the sense which could be understood using this rule of interpretation. The court continued that if the ECtHR, when interpreting a provision of the European Convention on Human Rights, attributes to a term a meaning different from an ordinary one, or if it interprets contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, a state has the right to refuse to implement a judgement against it as going beyond the obligations voluntarily accepted when ratifying the Convention. This is a far-reaching statement, which presupposes the ability to set aside not only interpretations of international courts, but international obligations in general. It can easily be used with regard to interpretations made by the EAEU Court in the future. But the Constitutional Court went further, stating that a judgment of the ECtHR cannot be considered obligatory if an interpretation of a provision of the Convention, made in defiance of the general rule of interpretation, would disagree with the imperative norms of general international law (jus cogens). The Constitutional Court considers sovereign equality and related rights, as well as noninterference in domestic matters as 'undoubted' norms jus cogens.
There are several issues with this point of view. It is not entirely clear if the interpretation violating jus cogens is one of the cases of possible 'wrongful' interpretation, particularly relevant for the case in hand, or the only one. Either way, sovereignty and noninterference, if considered part of jus cogens, could be interpreted quite broadly. The norms of jus cogens are far from clear in international law. 62 Even so, sovereign equality and noninterference are not usually listed as part of jus cogens. Generally speaking, it remains a mystery why the jus cogens argument was made at all. To some extent it evokes the Kadi case, where the General Court of the EU tried to use the jus cogens argument, which was eventually ignored by the ECJ. 
Conclusions
Without doubt, it will be a hard task for the EAEU Court to ensure the uniform application of EAEU law. This follows from the removal of the preliminary ruling procedure, which has left the Court without a powerful vehicle of interpretation of law and has isolated it from national courts. The new mechanism is rather hypothetical, and the uniform understanding and application of EAEU law by national courts is a major issue now. One can hardly speak of an integrated judiciary in the Eurasian space. Further, member states can more easily get away with violations of the Eurasian legal order, since the Commission can no longer bring them to the Court. This and a number of other limitations regarding the independence of the judges and their interpretative powers leave no assurance that member states will uphold their obligations on an everyday basis. The example of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Russia shows other obstacles in the way of the Court's ability to achieve its objective. It must be said that the resulting situation is caused by all the parties, which has led to the deterioration of the whole legal order -a situation that does not particularly benefit any of them. Therefore, solutions to the problem must be found, and it is clear that it must be done not in a confrontational manner, but by engaging in closer cooperation and dialogue.
